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INTRODUCTION
From the Great Lakes to pristine northern streams, Wisconsin boasts a
plentiful and valuable array of water resources. Yet water stress analyses show
that this natural capital is deeply threatened in a variety of ways. The pressure
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Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. DNR, 833 N.W.2d 800, 820–21 (Wis. 2013).
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.A.
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results primarily from human activity, ranging from general overuse to
colonization by anthropogenically introduced non-native species. Some of the
greatest water quality problems, however, are caused by land use practices that
lead to polluted runoff from farm fields and urban settings. The onset of climate
change has the potential to further exacerbate all of this. These issues, coupled
with the failure of existing law to effectively address them, confront regulators
and policy makers with difficult and novel questions. As a result, the next
century will demand innovative approaches to preserve the quality and quantity
of Wisconsin’s water resources for both public and private purposes.
The opening question is basic: Who bears responsibility to address these
emerging problems? As an initial matter, under both statutory and common
law, it is the state. Federal and state environmental laws vest it with that
authority, to the extent of their coverage. The public trust doctrine, long
established in our courts, likewise charges the state with protecting water
resources for current and future generations of Wisconsin citizens to use for
navigation, fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty. But the scope of the
environmental laws is limited, and recent developments in the Wisconsin
Legislature and court system have further curtailed the state’s power. For
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clarified that the public trust doctrine
does not apply to land use practices, thereby limiting its usefulness as a water
quality protection tool.1
One approach to this dilemma is to recognize that federal and state
government regulators, acting alone under current law, can no longer fully
protect water quality. New laws that fill the gap seem unlikely, meaning that
responsible engagement by local governments and private entities will be
essential.
Professor Henry Smith has already proposed that the law should treat water
much like intellectual property rights—as a “semicommons.”2 Smith argues
that exclusionary governance regimes are a poor fit for “fluid resources” and
instead calls for hybrid systems that combine private and common elements of
property.3 Smith’s theory—at least as he has expressed it to date—relates
primarily to private rights to use water under various legal systems currently in
place. But a broader conceptualization is also useful. If private entities have a
right to use water, they should also share a corresponding responsibility to
maintain the resource. Water quality is important for public and private uses
alike. This article will explore whether the semicommons approach could be
expanded to justify a more inclusive approach to responsibility for water quality
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concerns in addition to private use rights. Innovative proposals along those
lines could include involvement by local governments, including cities and
counties; voluntary programs; and even private sector involvement in water
quality preservation through increased grant or cost-sharing efforts, public
educational campaigns, limited public-private partnerships, and other
mechanisms. To be sure, this private role must come with safeguards that
protect the resource and simultaneously encourage broad participation.
I. ARRAY OF WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES FACING WISCONSIN
Wisconsin’s water resources have been negatively affected by “nonpoint”
source pollution, invasion by non-native species, and groundwater overuse and
depletion, among other threats.4 Climate change will further affect our
resources in unexpected ways.
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution
Perhaps the greatest threat to Wisconsin water quality comes from nonpoint
source pollution, meaning that it does not originate from traditional “end-ofpipe” sources. Rather, it emanates from diffuse sources washed by
precipitation over the land into surface waters.5 Examples include urban runoff
from paved areas such as roads and parking lots containing oil and grease,
sediment from poorly managed construction sites, and runoff containing excess
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides from agricultural lands as well as
bacteria and nutrients from livestock operations.6 Contributing agricultural
practices may include poorly located or managed animal feeding operations,
overgrazing, plowing errors, and improper application of pesticides, fertilizer,
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4. The World Resources Institute’s popular “Aqueduct” project measures and maps water risks
from the global to the local scales. See Aqueduct Measuring and Mapping Water Risk, WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/aqueduct [https://perma.cc/R9L6WUCE] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). The project results showed most of Wisconsin under either
“extremely high risk” or “high risk” for water quality impacts. Id.
5. See Thomas C. Brown & Pamela Froemke, Nationwide Assessment of Nonpoint Source
Threats to Water Quality, 62 BIOSCIENCE 136, 136 (2012).
6.
U.S.
Envtl.
Prot.
Agency,
What
is
Nonpoint
Source?,
EPA.GOV
https://www.epa.gov/nps/what-nonpoint-source [https://perma.cc/VC46-Z6X3] (last updated May 2,
2017); see also Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/nonpoint/ [https://perma.cc/S5EU-82BA] (last updated Jan. 5, 2017). In 1987,
as the federal government tried to strengthen federal efforts to regulate nonpoint source pollution (see
Section II.A, infra), EPA issued guidance defining nonpoint source pollution as “caused by diffuse
sources that are not regulated as point sources and normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural
and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc. In practical terms, nonpoint source
pollution does not result from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as a single pipe) but
generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation.” U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF WATER, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987).
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and irrigation water.7
The impacts of nonpoint source pollution on water quality can be severe.
State-level data compiled by United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) shows that agricultural nonpoint source pollution is the leading source
of water quality impacts on rivers and streams, the third-largest source of such
impacts on lakes, the second-largest source of wetland impairment, and a
frequent contributor to groundwater contamination.8 Excess nutrients from
agricultural runoff can cause increased nitrogen and phosphorus levels in
surface waters, resulting in algal blooms and lower dissolved oxygen levels for
aquatic life.9
At the state level, nonpoint pollution is “a leading cause of water quality
problems in Wisconsin.”10 It is a source of impairment to about 58% of
impaired waters listed under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act (CWA).11
Even worse, excess agricultural runoff containing “[m]anure, fertilizers,
pesticides, herbicides and pharmaceuticals may pollute groundwater.”12 This
problem is especially severe in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin, where at least
one-third of wells are unsafe for use as a drinking water source, partially due to
manure overspreading in agricultural settings.13
B. Non-Native Species
Wisconsin waters—and especially the Great Lakes—are also threatened
with a hostile takeover by non-native (sometimes called “invasive”) species.
Defining exactly what that means can be difficult. By some definitions, an
“invasive species” is any non-native species.14 But a more nuanced definition

05/20/2019 14:43:36
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7. See generally EPA, supra note 6.
EPA.GOV
8. U.S.
Envtl.
Prot.
Agency,
Nonpoint
Source:
Agriculture,
https://www.epa.gov/nps/nonpoint-source-agriculture [https://perma.cc/2JJE-DZWD] (last updated
Aug. 18, 2017); Robin K. Craig and Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate Nonpoint
Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3, 37 (2015).
9. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURAL RUNOFF,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Nonpoint/AgEnviromentalImpact.html [https://perma.cc/L7YT-K3GF].
10. Wis. DNR, supra note 6.
11. WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WISCONSIN’S NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT PLAN FFY 2016–2020, 24 (2015).
12. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Runoff,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Nonpoint/AgEnviromentalImpact.html [https://perma.cc/DEK5-QSV4] (last
updated May 26, 2015).
13. Lee Bergquist, One-Third of Wells in Kewaunee County Unsafe for Drinking Water,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Dec. 21, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/onethird-of-wells-in-kewaunee-county-unsafe-for-drinking-water-b99636500z1-363176361.html/
[https://perma.cc/58D9-Y4HL].
14. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Invasive Species, https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/invasivespecies [https://perma.cc/AQ5M-JUE8] (last updated Aug. 14, 2017).
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is increasingly appropriate—an “invasive species” is a non-native species
“whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm
or harm to human health.”15
The latter definition makes plain that not all non-native species are invasive.
Most non-native species cause no economic or environmental harm; indeed,
many are beneficial, including cattle, wheat, soybeans, and tulips.16
Nevertheless, under any definition, some “invasive” species certainly are a
problem for the Great Lakes region. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration estimates that “[t]he Great Lakes ecosystem has been severely
damaged by more than 180 invasive and non-native species.”17 The bestknown invaders, such as the zebra mussel, quagga mussel, sea lamprey, and
alewife, “degrad[e] habitat, out-compet[e] native species, and short-circuit[ ]
food webs.”18 The impact on diverse industries including commercial and sport
fishing, tourism, and even agriculture can be severe; recent estimates put the
economic damages at “significantly over $100 million annually.”19
Moreover, such economic damage estimates do not fully value the
nonmonetary damages involved in the displacement of native organisms or the
destruction of ecosystems.20 Costs typically not considered include the impact
on natural ecosystems, the extinction of native species, lost water-purification
capability, aesthetic and recreational impacts, and weakened resistance to
impacts of invasions by other species in the future.21 When damage to those

05/20/2019 14:43:36

C M
Y K

40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 67 Side A

15. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999). The Order was intended
to “prevent the introduction of invasive species and provide for their control and to minimize the
economic, ecological, and human health impacts that invasive species cause.” Id.
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-1, INVASIVE SPECIES: CLEARER FOCUS
AND GREATER COMMITMENT NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE PROBLEM 8 (2002)
(hereinafter GAO); see also NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, 2008-2012 NATIONAL INVASIVE
SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (2008) (“Most nonnative species . . . are not harmful; and many are
highly beneficial.”).
17.
Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Invasive Species: Great Lakes Region,
http://www.regions.noaa.gov/great-lakes/index.php/great_lakes-restoration-initiative/invasivespecies/ [https://perma.cc/4DNJ-X9NG] (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). The Environmental Protection
Agency estimates that this includes at least twenty-five species of invasive fish along with many
invasive plants. U.S. EPA, supra note 14.
18. NOAA, supra note 17. For an outstanding and detailed discussion of the history and impact
of invasive species in the Great Lakes, see DAN EGAN, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT LAKES
1-150 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2017).
19. Alex L. Rosaen et al., The Costs of Aquatic Invasive Species to Great Lakes States, THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY 1 (Mar. 5, 2012),
https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/areas/greatlakes/ais-economic-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KSZ-KFVE].
20. GAO, supra note 16, at 13. “Most economic estimates do not consider all of the relevant
effects of nonnative species or the future risks that they pose.” Id. at “Highlights ofGAO-03-1”.
21. Id. at 13, 23, 55; John D. Rothlisberger et al., Ship-Borne Nonindigenous Species Diminish
Great Lakes Ecosystem Services, 15 ECOSYSTEMS 462, 462 (2012).
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“ecosystem services” are considered, the economic toll on the Great Lakes may
rise to $800 million annually.22
C. Groundwater Overuse and Depletion
More than twenty percent of Wisconsin’s land area lies within the Great
Lakes basin.23 Vast tracts of the state, therefore, do not have access to Great
Lakes water and largely depend on groundwater for municipal and industrial
supplies. As a matter of hydrogeology, groundwater pumping lowers water
levels in connected bodies of water, sometimes other groundwater but more
often streams and other surface waters.24 In some areas, groundwater overuse
has led to significant consequences for those connected waters. This section
discusses two examples: the Central Sands region of the state and the City of
Waukesha.
1. Central Sands
In the United States, irrigated agriculture is sometimes thought to be mostly
localized to the arid western states. Increasingly, this is untrue; “[i]rrigated
agriculture has expanded greatly in the water-rich U.S. northern lake states
during the past half century.”25 Such “supplemental” irrigation, while not
necessary for crop survival, augments production and extends the growing
season.26 However, this practice can create significant environmental
challenges when groundwater is shallow and closely connected to local surface
waters.27
Those tight connections between surface and ground waters are present in
Wisconsin’s “central sands,” a region that encompasses about 1.75 million

05/20/2019 14:43:36
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22. Rothlisberger, supra note 21. “Ecosystem services” are services provided by natural
systems that were historically not valued in markets because of their nature as public goods. Laurie A.
Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The Role of Federal Policy in Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets,
20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 385, 385 (2010). Increased recognition of their value has led to
increasing calls to remedy this exclusion. See generally id.
23.
Wis.
Dep’t
of
Natural
Resources,
Wisconsin’s
Great
Lakes,
https://www.dnr.wi.gov/topic/Greatlakes/learn.html [https://perma.cc/38BG-MG2Q] (last updated
May 3, 2017).
24. See, e.g., Sharon Megdal et al., The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water Law and the
Environment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 276 (2011) (“groundwater pumping . . . creates a
‘cone of depression’” in the water table surrounding a well); Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust:
Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 202
(2008) (“[G]roundwater is often directly connected to surface water [and] pumping can seriously affect
the amount of water that would otherwise remain in rivers, lakes, springs, and wetlands.”).
25. George J. Kraft et al., Irrigation Effects in the Northern Lake States: Wisconsin Central
Sands Revisited, 50 GROUNDWATER 308, 308 (2012) (hereinafter Kraft (2012)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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acres overlying a shallow glacial aquifer in parts of Adams, Marathon,
Marquette, Portage, Shawano, Waupaca, Waushara, and Wood counties.28 In
many parts of the region, the aquifer lies only a few feet below the ground.29
The region contains over 800 miles of high-quality “trout streams”30 and over
300 lakes, most of which are largely sourced from groundwater.31
As of 2010, over 2300 high capacity wells32 irrigate about 200,000 acres
in the Central Sands region.33 The number of wells, and the acreage served,
has grown significantly in recent decades.34 Meanwhile, surface water levels
and stream discharges have been substantially lower, and some lakes and
streams substantially disappear during dry seasons.35 The question, of course,
is whether these two phenomena are connected.
Recent studies conclusively show that they are. A well-researched 2012
report found that “[i]rrigation stresses are sufficient to explain the previously
rare or never before observed low-water conditions that have prevailed since
2000 in the Wisconsin central sands.”36 Precipitation during the same period
was at average or slightly below average levels, ruling out a drought as the
likely cause of the lower levels.37 Over one-third of the base flow of some
streams has been diverted due to groundwater pumping for agriculture.38 The
increased pumping activities cause a net “recharge reduction” sufficient to
explain the drastic decreases in surface water levels.39
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28. WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, CENTRAL WISCONSIN SAND AND GRAVEL
AQUIFER: MANAGING WATER FOR MULTIPLE USES 1 (2013).
29. Id.
30. “Trout streams” are generally defined to include streams that contain either a selfsustaining trout population, a trout population that may become self-sustaining, or a stream with habitat
of sufficient quality to be stocked with trout to provide trout fishing. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §
NR 820.12(2)–(4) (2017) (defining Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 trout streams). Wisconsin regulations
direct the Department of Natural Resources to take into account the existence of such streams when
considering and approving applications for new high capacity wells. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR
820.30(1) – (2) (2017).
31. Wis. DNR, supra note 23, at 1.
32. WIS. STAT. § 281.34(1)(b) (2015–2016) (A “high capacity well” is “a well . . . that, together
with all other wells on the same property . . . has a capacity [to pump] more than 100,000 gallons per
day.”); see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 820.12(11) (2017).
33.
GEORGE J. KRAFT & DAVID J. MECHENICH, Groundwater Pumping Effects on
Groundwater Levels, Lake Levels, and Streamflows in the Wisconsin Central Sands, at iii (2010)
(hereinafter Kraft (2010)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Kraft (2012), supra note 25, at 316.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. “Recharge reduction” means a decrease in the amount of water recharging groundwater
levels and is often caused by changes in land use. See Hasan M. Hameed, et al., Impacts of Urban
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2. Waukesha, Wisconsin, and the Great Lakes Compact
The story of the water supply in Waukesha, Wisconsin is a textbook
example of how overuse slowly degrades a resource. Over a century ago,
Waukesha became known as “Spring City” for the quality of its spring water,
known nationwide and even believed by some to have healing properties.40 As
Waukesha grew, so did the demand on its wells. The eventual “mining” of the
aquifer resulted in plummeting water levels and increasing contamination.41
Eventually, levels of radium—a carcinogen—in the deep aquifer came to far
exceed federal drinking water standards.42 In 2003, city leaders signed a
consent order with the State of Wisconsin and agreed to take “steps to achieve
compliance with state radionuclide requirements” by December 2006.43 As to
federal standards, the EPA ordered Waukesha to find a safe water supply by
2018.44 These legal and practical circumstances resulted in Waukesha deciding
to abandon its historic springs, and turn to the comparatively abundant
freshwater resource about twenty miles to its east—the Great Lakes.
Before it could tap the Great Lakes for its public water supply, however,
Waukesha faced a legal hurdle—the Great Lakes Compact.45 The Compact, an
agreement between Wisconsin and the other Great Lakes states, generally
operates as a ban on new and increased diversions of Great Lakes water outside
the Great Lakes basin, with certain limited exceptions.46 One of those
exceptions allows communities located outside the basin, but within counties
that straddle the basin line, to apply for a diversion.47 Waukesha is the first
community to seek that exception,48 and its application drew close attention
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Growth on Groundwater Levels Using Remote Sensing- Case Study: Erbil City, Kurdistan Region of
Iraq, 5 J. Nat. Sci. Research 72, 72 (2015).
40. See generally Egan, supra note 18, at 256–64.
41. See generally Christina L. Wabiszewski, Diversions from the Great Lakes: Out of the
Watershed and in Contravention of the Compact, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 627, 646 (2016); see also Egan,
supra note 18, at 264.
42. Wabiszewski, supra note 41, at 646–47.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Id.
45. The Great Lakes Compact has been enacted by the state legislatures of all member states,
approved by Congress, and was signed by then-President George W. Bush on Oct. 3, 2008. See, e.g.,
WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2015–16); Wabiszewski, supra note 43, at 639.
46. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (“All new or increased diversions are prohibited” with certain
exceptions); see generally Amanda K. Beggs, “Death by a Thousand Straws”: Why and How the Great
Lakes Council Should Define “Reasonable Water Supply Alternative” Within the Great Lakes
Compact, 100 IOWA L. REV. 361, 365, 370–71 (2014).
47. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c) (communities in counties that straddle the basin line may
apply for an exception to the general prohibition on diversions, provided certain conditions are met).
48. Wabiszewski, supra note 41, at 634.
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locally and nationally.49 Under the Compact, Waukesha had to demonstrate,
among other things, that it had “no reasonable water supply alternative,” that
its need could not be reasonably avoided through the efficient use and
conservation of existing water supplies, that the diversion would be limited to
a “reasonable” amount of water, and that it would cause no significant impacts
to the quantity or quality of the basin waters.50 All eight Great Lakes states had
the opportunity to veto the application.51 Fortunately for Waukesha, none
did—the Compact Council approved its application in June 2016,52 and the
approval survived a subsequent legal challenge by the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence Cities Initiative.53
These case studies serve as cautionary tales; without intervention, they may
herald a looming threat for other parts of Wisconsin that depend on
groundwater. Waukesha took advantage of an exception in the Great Lakes
Compact to secure a more stable water supply, but other communities will
certainly not be so fortunate.
D. Climate Change and Water Resources
The onset of climate change will pose many challenges for water resources
management.54 These may include climatic impacts such as droughts and
floods, as well as corresponding impacts to agriculture and food security, public
health impacts, and environmental impacts on ecosystems and species.55 A

05/20/2019 14:43:36

C M
Y K

40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 69 Side A

49. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Waukesha Plan for Lake Michigan Water Raises Worries, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/us/waukesha-plan-for-lake-michiganwater-raises-worries.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F4LB-C6A2].
50. WIS. STAT. §§ 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(d), (4n)(d)(1), (2), (4).
51. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(g) (“Council approval shall be given unless one or more
council members vote to disapprove.”).
52. Application by the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin for a Diversion of Great Lakes Water
from Lake Michigan and an Exception to Allow the Diversion, No. 2016-1 (Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
River Basin Water Res. Council June 21, 2016) (final decision) http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Doc
s/Waukesha/Waukesha—Final%20Decision%20of%20Compact%20Council%206-21-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JQ3-7SE6].
53. See City of Waukesha, No. 2016-1 (Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Res.
Compact Council May 4, 2017) (opinion) http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Docs/Waukesha/Compac
t%20Council%20Opinion%20on%20GLSLCI%20Request%20for%20Hearing%205-4-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC52-TZUD]. The Cities Initiative generally argued that the public input process
was inadequate and that Waukesha had a “reasonable water supply alternative” that could have avoided
the need for the diversion. Id. It also repeatedly expressed a concern that granting Waukesha’s
application would set a negative precedent authorizing future “straws in the lake.” Id.
54. See generally Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change
World: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409 (2009);
Dustin Charapata, Conference Report, Climate and Water Policy: When is the Right Time to Adjust
Course?, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 425 (2011); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER
PROGRAM 2012 STRATEGY: RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2012).
55. Eckstein, supra note 54 at 415–16, 419–24.
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detailed examination of these impacts is beyond the scope of this paper.
Wisconsin will certainly not be immune. Impacts here will likely include
increased flooding and degraded water quality.56 The University of
Wisconsin’s Water Sustainability and Climate Project has simulated an
innovative set of scenarios that explore how our region may respond to the
potentially devastating impacts associated with climate change.57
II. EXISTING LEGAL REGIMES CANNOT MEET THESE CHALLENGES
The problems described in the previous section have the potential to
devastate the Great Lakes and the population that relies on them. Yet existing
federal and state laws and regulations are inadequate to respond, as described
in the following sections.
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Elephant That Fell Through the Cracks
Nonpoint source pollution presents difficult regulatory challenges because
of problems in identifying its origin and magnitude over time. Despite
widespread recognition that it is the leading source of water quality
impairments, current regulatory approaches have been almost completely
unsuccessful in controlling water quality impacts from nonpoint sources.58
Multiple levels of government play a role in nonpoint source management.
Traditionally, decisions about water allocation and management have been left
to the states.59 By the early 1970s, however, the federal government took on
an increasing role in pollution control. The bellwether of federal water
protection laws, the Clean Water Act (“Act”), is intended to “restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
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56. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Climate Change Means for Wisconsin (Aug. 2016). This
document has been removed from EPA’s current website but is temporarily available at
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/climate-changewi.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4S7-ADYM] and is also on file with the author.
57. See Univ. of Wis. Water Sustainability and Climate Project, Yahara 2070, WISC.EDU,
https://wsc.limnology.wisc.edu/yahara2070/about-yahara-2070 [https://perma.cc/4BUA-TDZA] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2017).
58. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmental Law, 39 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 42, 85 (2014); Sonya Dewan, Emissions Trading: A Cost-Effective Approach to Reducing
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 234 (2004). In contrast, the Clean
Water Act has been very successful in reducing pollution from point sources. Warner, supra, at 85.
59. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Comprehensive River Basin Management: The Limits of
Collaborative, Stakeholder-Based, Water Governance, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 117 (2009) (citing
a “tradition of federal deference to state responsibility for water allocation and management”);
Alexandra Campbell-Ferrari, Managing Interstate Water Resources: Tarrant Regional and Beyond,
44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 235, 235–36 (2014) (“issues of water resources management have been left in the
hands of states”).
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waters,”60 and serves as the primary source of federal authority over water
pollution.61 The core of the Act prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by
any person” from any “point source” to navigable waters, except as authorized
by permit.62 The precise meanings of these terms have provoked much
litigation, but at issue here is the Clean Water Act’s regulation—or lack
thereof—of nonpoint source pollution.
The term “nonpoint source” is not defined in the Clean Water Act and has
generally been taken to mean all sources other than point sources.63 Unlike
point sources, nonpoint sources are not subject to the national permit system.64
Instead, the statute as initially drafted “leaves the regulation of nonpoint source
pollution to the states.”65 For example, Section 208 directs the states to develop
“areawide waste treatment management plans” to, among other things,
Identify . . . agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources
of pollution, including return flows from irrigated agriculture, and their
cumulate effects, runoff from manure disposal areas, and from land used
for livestock and crop production, and (ii) set forth procedures and
methods (including land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible
such sources.66

Courts have consistently interpreted the statute this way since its passage.67
After states largely failed to control nonpoint pollution, in 1987, Congress
created a new section of the Clean Water Act intended to incentivize them to
do so.68 Rather than taking a regulatory approach, as with point sources,
Congress created a grant program that provides funds to states that develop and
implement nonpoint source management programs. Specifically, Section 319
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60. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
61. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2005).
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362(12).
63. Robin Kundis Craig, Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas and Sovereign Immunity:
Federal Facility Nonpoint Sources, the APA, and the Meaning of “In the Same Manner and to the
Same Extent as any Nongovernmental Entity,” 30 Envtl. L. 527, 533 (2000) (“[N]onpoint sources are,
by definition, not point sources” ). By contrast, the Clean Water Act defines “point source” to
mean “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14).
64. Cf. Final Decision, note 52, supra, and accompanying text (Act regulates “discharge of any
pollutant by any person” from point sources to navigable waters) (emphasis added).
65. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 219 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(7) (1987)).
66. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(a), 1288(b)(2)(F).
67. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir. 1976) (“Congress
consciously distinguished between point source and nonpoint source discharges, giving EPA authority
under the [Clean Water] Act to regulate only the former.”).
68. See Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F.2d 1337, 1352–55 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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of the statute directs a state seeking federal funding to prepare assessment
reports “identifying best management practices and measures to control each
category and subcategory of nonpoint sources”69 and to prepare management
programs “for controlling pollution added from nonpoint sources to the
navigable waters within the State.”70 Between 1990 and 2016, the EPA
awarded over $4.2 billion in aid under the program.71 Nevertheless, as noted
above, nonpoint sources remain the leading cause of water impairment
nationally.72
In pursuing its goal of fishable and swimmable waters,73 the Clean Water
Act has been quite successful at addressing pollution from “point sources” such
as pipes.74 By definition, nonpoint sources are outside that scope and are only
loosely regulated by the Clean Water Act.75
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) similarly
identifies nonpoint source pollution as “a leading cause of water quality
problems in Wisconsin.”76 The state has developed and attempted to
implement its Nonpoint Source Program Management Plan.77 As an example
of its activities under that program, the DNR has set “Runoff Management”
minimum standards of performance for agricultural and non-agricultural
sites.78 But older Wisconsin farms are often subjected to such standards only
when large cost-share percentage grants are available to fund compliance.79
Wisconsin’s approach to nonpoint source pollution “centers on statewide
enforceable agricultural and non-agricultural performance standards and
manure management prohibitions.”80 These standards consist of “minimum
expectations” applied to a variety of land use practices in both agricultural and
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69. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(C).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1).
71.
See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 319 Grant Program for States and Territories,
https://www.epa.gov/nps/319-grant-program-states-and-territories
[https://perma.cc/NK7Z-55NY]
(last updated Oct. 19, 2017).
72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
73. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (a goal of the Clean Water Act is to “provide[ ] for the
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provide[ ] for recreation in and on the
water”).
74. Cf. Kronk, supra note 58, at 85.
75. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (expressly excluding “agricultural stormwater discharges and
return flows from irrigated agriculture” from the definition of a point source).
76. Wis. DNR, supra note 6; see also supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
77. Wis. DNR, supra note 6.
78. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151 (2017).
79.
See WIS. STAT. § 281.16(3)(e) (2015–2016); WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §§ NR
151.09(4)(d), 151.09(5).
80. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 9; see generally WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR. § NR 151
(agricultural and non-agricultural performance standards).

40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A

05/20/2019 14:43:36

9. S TRIFLING.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

SEMICOMMONS AND WIS. WATER QUALITY

9/21/2018 1:52 PM

137

developed areas.81 The DNR sets these standards but depends on the Wisconsin
Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection to implement the
program in conjunction with county officials.82 In interviews, DNR staff
described this authority as robust.83 It includes numerous agricultural
performance standards, including tillage setbacks,84 a maximum “phosphorus
index,”85 process wastewater handling restrictions,86 maximum soil erosion
rates,87 regulations for manure storage facilities,88 nutrient management
planning requirements,89 and manure management standards and
prohibitions.90 Non-agricultural standards also exist and include sediment
discharge regulations applicable to construction sites91 and standards for
developed urban areas.92
However, implementation of the standards remains a significant challenge,
primarily due to lack of funding but also due to “insufficient staff levels,
inadequate time and resources at both the state and county levels, and the lack
of cost-share dollars for both hard (e.g. structural) and soft (e.g. management)
practices.”93 Effective horizontal coordination between the two responsible
state agencies, as well as effective vertical coordination between the agencies
and the counties, has also proven difficult.94
In the end, nonpoint source pollution remains the leading source of water
impairments in Wisconsin. Under the Act, each state is required to prepare a
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81. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 10.
82. Id. at 8, 10 (“WDATCP establishes technical standards and other elements related to
program implementation”).
83. Telephone interview with with Brian Weigel (WDNR), Corrinne Johnson (WDNR), and
Andrew Craig (WDNR) (May 8, 2017) (notes on file with author).
84. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.03 (intended to “prevent tillage operations from
destroying stream banks and depositing soil directly in surface waters”).
85. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.04. The Phosphorus Index is an “agricultural land
management planning tool for assessing the potential of a cropped or grazed field to contribute
phosphorus to the surface water.”). Wis. Admin. Code § NR 151.015(15s).
86. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.055 (prohibiting significant discharges of process
wastewater to waters of the state).
87. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.02 (maximum soil erosion rate should be less than or
equal to the “‘tolerable’ (T) rate established for that soil.”).
88. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.05 (establishing construction, alteration, and closure
standards for new and existing facilities).
89. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.07(3) (manure, fertilizer, and other nutrients must be
“applied in conformance with a nutrient management plan”).
90.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §§ NR 151.07–151.08 (prohibiting manure overflows,
unconfined piles, and direct runoff from stored manure into state waters).
91. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §§ NR 151.105–121.
92. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151, Subch. III-IV.
93. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 11.
94. See id.

40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 71 Side B

05/20/2019 14:43:36

9. S TRIFLING.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

138

MARQ. INTELL.PROP. L. REV.

9/21/2018 1:52 PM

[Vol. 22:1

list of waters not meeting current water quality standards.95 Wisconsin
proposed 301 pollutant/water quality segment combinations for its 2014 list.96
Nonpoint source pollution is by far the leading cause—it is the dominant source
of pollution for 43% of these listings and a source to another 15% of the
impaired waters listed.97
Tensions caused by the intractable nature of the nonpoint source pollution
problem boiled over in 2015. Frustrated with the failure of federal and Iowa
state law to address nonpoint source pollution, one political subdivision of Iowa
sued another.98 The Des Moines Water Works sued several upstream drainage
districts, alleging state tort claims and federal and state statutory and
constitutional claims.99 The Water Works “allege[d] that there has been an
increased level of nitrates in [its] water supply caused by the drainage districts
channeling of nitrate-contaminated ground water into the water supply.”100
Ultimately, the federal district court dismissed all claims against the drainage
district after the Iowa Supreme Court, responding to questions certified by the
district court, found that the drainage districts had unqualified immunity against
the Water Works’ claims for damages and equitable remedies.101
Frustrated with the ruling, Des Moines Water Works CEO Bill Stowe
issued a news release blaming “unregulated industrial agriculture” for
“expensive, serious and escalating water pollution problems” in Central
Iowa.102 Stowe also implored the Iowa Legislature to take action “addressing
meaningful, long-term, sustainably funded policy solutions to our serious water
problems.”103
B. Ineffective Controls on Invasive Species
Federal and state laws, regulations, and policies have also proven largely
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95. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012).
96. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 24.
97. Id, at 24-25. The next leading cause is atmospheric deposition, which was the leading cause
for about 19% of impairments. Point sources were the leading cause for almost none of the
impairments. Id.
98. Bd. of Water Works Trs. of Des Moines v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. C 15-4020LTS, 2017 WL 1042072, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 17, 2017).
99.
Bd. of Water Works Trs. of Des Moines, 2017 WL 1042072, at *1.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id. at *1, *2.
102. MacKenzie Elmer, Des Moines Water Works Won’t Appeal Lawsuit, DES MOINES
REGISTER (Apr. 11, 2017, 8:19 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2017/04/11/desmoines-water-works-not-appeal-lawsuit/100321222/ [https://perma.cc/BGB7-2VGX].
103. Donnelle Eller, With Water Works’ Lawsuit Dismissed, Water Quality is the Legislature’s
Problem, DES MOINES REGISTER (Mar. 20, 2017, 11:50 AM)
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/money/agriculture/2017/03/17/judge-dismisses-water-works-nitrates-lawsuit/99327928/
[https://perma.cc/66C7-BUF2].
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inadequate to control the spread of invasive species, as discussed next.
Almost twenty-five years ago, in 1993, the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) found that “[t]he current Federal framework is
a largely uncoordinated patchwork of laws, regulations, policies, and programs.
Some focus on narrowly drawn problems. Many others peripherally address
[invasive species]. In general, present Federal efforts only partially match the
problems at hand.”104
The core problems identified in the OTA report remain unsolved today
despite some small improvements in the federal government’s organizational
response to invasive species prompted by then-President Clinton’s Executive
Order 13,112.105 That Order generally imposed duties on federal agencies to
prevent the introduction and establishment of invasive species106 but only to the
extent “practicable” and “subject to the availability of appropriations,
and . . . budgetary limits.”107 In 2016, President Obama signed another
Executive Order that continued federal efforts to control invasive species and
incorporated considerations of climate change.108
Many of the invasive species threatening the Great Lakes originated in the
ballast water holds of ocean going vessels.109 This is particularly true of zebra
and quagga mussels.110 In an early response to this problem, and especially the
spread of invasive mussels in the Great Lakes, Congress enacted the NonIndigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention Control Act (NANPCA).111
NANPCA regulates the release of ballast water carried to the United States
from areas beyond the United States’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), meaning
coastal waters extending beyond 200 miles of the United States coastline.112

05/20/2019 14:43:36

C M
Y K

40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 72 Side A

104. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-F-565, HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS
SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES 163 (1993).
105. For example, the Order created the National Invasive Species Council to oversee and
implement the federal response to invasive species, among other duties. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64
Fed. Reg. 6183, 6184–85 (Feb. 3, 1999).
106. Id. at 6184.
107. Id.
108. Exec. Order No. 13,751, 81 Fed. Reg. 90181 (Dec. 8, 2016)
109. Nat’l RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., GREAT LAKES SHIPPING, TRADE,
AND AQUATIC INVASIVE SPECIES, at ix-x (2008); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 830-R-15-004,
ANALYSIS OF BALLAST WATER DISCHARGES INTO THE GREAT LAKES FROM OVERSEAS VESSELS
FROM 2010 TO 2013 1 (2015) (ballast water is a “primary vector” for introduction of aquatic invasive
species to the Great Lakes).
110. Nat’l Research Council, supra note 109, at ix.
111. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701–4751 (2012). Congress stated that one purpose of NANPCA is to
“prevent unintentional introduction and dispersal of nonindigenous species into waters of the United
States through ballast water management and other requirements.” Id. § 4701(b)(1); see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 4711(b)(2)(B)(iii); 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(3), 151.2035(b)(3) (2017).
112. Id. §§ 4702(5), 4711(b)(2)(A).
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NANPCA requires vessels carrying such water to choose one of three
compliance options. First, such vessels may completely “exchange” such
ballast water before entering the 200-mile EEZ.113 That exchange eliminates
the invasive species from the ballast water either by discharging them into deep
sea waters, or by increasing the salinity content of the ballast water to levels
that cannot sustain life.114 Second, such vessels may retain the same ballast
water during the entire time they are within the EEZ.115 Third, the vessels have
the theoretical option to comply with other alternative methods approved by the
Coast Guard.116
At the regulatory level, the EPA has also issued a Vessel General Permit
(VGP) that regulates ballast water discharges pursuant to the Clean Water
Act.117 Four environmental groups sued EPA over the VGP, claiming that it
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it selected the standards and
requirements in the VGP.118 The court ultimately agreed and remanded some
portions of the permit to EPA for reconsideration.119
These limited efforts have occasioned some—but not enough—positive
results. In 2015, the EPA prepared a report analyzing ballast water discharges
to the Great Lakes and concluded that ballast water flushing requirements are
“estimated to be at least 95 percent effective” and have caused a decrease in the
rate of new invasive species discoveries in the Great Lakes.120 But the measures
have not been, and likely cannot be, completely effective, and much of the
damage has already been done.
The only other federal law particularly notable here is the Great Lakes Fish
and Wildlife Restoration Act, which provides authority for the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission to “eradicate or minimize” invasive sea lamprey
populations in the Great Lakes.121
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113. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B)(i) ; 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(1), 151.2035(b)(1).
114. Cory Hebert, Ballast Water Management: Federal, States, and International Regulations,
37 S.U.L. REV. 315, 321 (2010).
115. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(2), 151.2035(b)(2); accord 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B)(ii)
(vessels may discharge ballast in “other waters where the exchange does not pose a threat of infestation
or spread of aquatic nuisance species in the Great Lakes and other waters of the United States”).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2012); 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(3), 151.2025 (2017).
117. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA HQ-OW-2011-0141-0949, NATIONAL POLLUTANT
DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES) VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT FOR DISCHARGES
INCIDENTAL TO NORMAL OPERATION OF A VESSEL (VGP) (2013). The Second Circuit also
summarized its provisions as part of the discussion in Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 808 F.3d 556, 564, 567-68 (2d Cir. 2015).
118. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 569–70 (2d Cir. 2015).
119. Id. at 571–84.
120. U.S. EPA, supra note 109, at 2.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 941c(b)(3) (2012). Historically, this has been done by strategic applications
of a “lampreycide” poison that controls, but does not eradicate, lamprey populations in the Great Lakes.
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It is unlikely that the deficiencies in federal law will be remedied by statebased solutions, by the common law, or even by executive order. Many of the
individual states, including Wisconsin, have enacted some invasive species
control programs or measures.122 However, by their very nature, invasive
species are unlikely to remain within a single state. This is especially true of
water-based species, but even terrestrial species typically move about the
country with little respect for political boundaries.
C. Groundwater Overpumping
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See Egan, supra note 18, at 50–65 (describing the initial lamprey invasion, population boom, and
eventual control and management).
122. See, e.g., WI Dep’t of Natural Resources, Control Methods, http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/invas
ives/control.html [https://perma.cc/E999-LJMH] (last updated Nov. 8, 2016).
123. See Wis. Stat. § 281.34(2).
124. See AKBA Ltd. P’ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶ 12, 648 N.W.2d 854; Borsellino v.
DNR, 2000 WI App 27, ¶ 19, 606 N.W.2d 255.
125. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(2) (2015–16).
126. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4) (extended review required with respect to wells in groundwater
protection zones, wells for which more than 95% of the water withdrawn would be lost from the basin,
and wells that could have a significant impact on a spring).
127. ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. DNR, 648 N.W.2d 854 ¶ 12 (Wis. 2002).
128. See Lake Beulah Mgmt. District v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, ¶¶ 3–4, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799
N.W.2d 73.
129. The public trust doctrine can be traced back to ancient Roman law and the Institutes of
Justinian. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1253 (2016) (doctrine’s “roots are in the
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The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources regulates groundwater
withdrawals—and specifically high capacity wells— under Chapter 281 of the
Wisconsin Statutes.123 The agency also has general authority as the state’s
designated “trustee” under the public trust doctrine.124 As described next,
neither source of power is sufficient to address the overpumping described in
Section I.C. of this Article.
As an initial matter, one seeking to install a high capacity well must obtain
approval from the Department before constructing the well.125 In certain
special cases, the Department must conduct an environmental review of the
well’s potential impacts.126 But most wells do not fall into those categories;
and in such cases, the statute is silent regarding the scope of the Department’s
authority to review the application or to impose conditions on the operation of
the well.
In those cases, the Department had historically relied on its general
authority under the public trust doctrine127 to impose conditions as needed.128
As the name suggests, that doctrine is generally taken to mean that a state must
act as “trustee” of certain natural resources, particularly the navigable waters
of the state, and manage them for the trust beneficiaries—its people.129 It is
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rooted in the state constitution,130 which itself borrowed heavily from the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.131
In 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expansively interpreted the public
trust doctrine as a valid basis for DNR to consider whether to grant,
conditionally grant, or deny a high capacity well permit based on the well’s
impact on other waters of the state.132 In a remarkable turn of events, however,
that decision may no longer be good law.
In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), which
requires explicit statutory or regulatory authority for actions taken by
administrative agencies, including the imposition of permit conditions. In late
2015, a Wisconsin trial court relied on § 227.10(2m) to prevent DNR from
imposing certain conditions in a high-capacity well permit.133 And in a 2016
opinion, Attorney General Brad Schimel concluded that “[t]hrough these
changes to the law, [DNR’s] public trust duty . . . reverts back to the
Legislature, which is responsible for making rules and statutes necessary to
protect the waters of the state.”134 This interpretation could prevent DNR from
imposing high capacity well permit conditions—or conceivably, from taking
any action whatsoever based solely on the constitutionality—and common lawrooted public trust doctrine.
All of this likely means that in cases where the statute is silent—as in all
high capacity well applications other than the special exceptions noted above—
the Department has no authority to impose conditions on the operation of high
capacity wells.135
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Institutes of Justinian, part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, the body of Roman law that is the ‘foundation
for modern civil law systems.’”). In this country, the United States Supreme Court recognized it in the
seminal 1892 decision Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
130. Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1 (“the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the
Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways
and forever free”).
131. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, art. IV (“The navigable
waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall
be common highways, and forever free”).
132. Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Wis. DNR, 799 N.W.2d 73 ¶¶ 3–5 (Wis. 2011).
133. Decision and Order, New Chester Dairy v. DNR, Case No. 2014CV1055 (Outagamie
County Cir. Ct. (Dec. 2, 2015).
134. State of Wis. Dep’t of Justice, OAG-01-16, Opinion Letter on the Application of Wis.
Stat. § 227.10(2m) to the Issuance of High Capacity Groundwater Well Withdrawal Permits ¶ 53 (May
10, 2016).
135. See also 2017 Wisconsin Act 10 (signed June 1, 2017) (no additional Department
approval is necessary for an existing high capacity well owner to repair, maintain, or reconstruct the
well within a 75-foot radius of the existing well or to transfer it to a new owner as part of a land sale).
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III. INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS
The final section of this Article begins to map out the theoretical
underpinnings for alternative approaches to water quality using Professor
Henry Smith’s theory of the “semicommons.” It also identifies possible
innovative approaches to nonpoint source management, one of the problems
discussed above. Similar development with respect to invasive species
management and groundwater overpumping is left for future work.
A. Extending Smith’s Theory of the Semicommons from Water Use Rights
(Quantity) to Water Quality
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136. Henry E. Smith, Semicommons in Fluid Resources, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
195, 196 (2016).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 197.
139. Id. at 197–98.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 198.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property
Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 449 (2008) (“A semicommons exists where private and common
property overlap and potentially interact.”).
144. Smith, supra note 136, at 208.
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Professor Henry Smith has proposed that water and other “fluid resources,”
such as intellectual property, “call for hybrid property systems combining
private and common elements.”136 Smith calls this combination a
“semicommons” and admits that it “require[s] much more fine-tuning through
rules . . . than do more-familiar kinds of resources.”137
“[S]eparation between groups of uses is difficult,” Smith notes, when it
comes to fluid resources.138 This leads to an important dilemma, because fluid
resources are valuable for a variety of uses by a variety of users.139 This can
lead to conflict when (as Smith notes) the uses are on different scales;140 or (we
might add) when the uses are incompatible because one degrades the water’s
purity to the point that it is unfit for the other’s use. To put this in Smith’s
terms, “sometimes strategic behavior will allow shifting more than a
proportionate cost to others and grabbing disproportionate benefits.”141
Smith analyzes two theoretical poles of property law to fluid resources:
exclusion and governance.142 The solution, Smith writes, is to conceptualize
fluid resources “to a regime of semicommons, in which different interacting
uses are subject to different property regimes, some private and some
common.”143 In the end, these public and private rights “interlock so tightly
that it makes sense to see them as different versions of semicommons.”144
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While Smith’s work refers generally to the implications of the
semicommons for “water law,”145 his analysis is primarily devoted to the
allocation of private water rights—in other words, to water quantity. Yet in so
many situations, that quantity is tightly related to water quality.146 It has long
been recognized that “[a]ny separation between water quantity and water
quality is artificial and stands in the way of solutions.”147 In Smith’s
terminology, “the claim is that as the interactivity and importance of third-party
effects become more important we will not only get more delineation effort but
that it will take the form of more governance.”148 Of course, the same is true
of water quality impacts caused by third parties. Smith also recognizes that
certain public uses and public trust rights, such as navigation, may override
private rights to use water.149
Given the close relationship between water quantity and water quality, it is
worth investigating whether the “semicommons” should extend in some form
to concerns over both elements. Recognized rights to use the resource on the
one hand should lead to corresponding responsibilities on the other. Even prior
to the advent of modern laws that protect water quality, courts had long held
that where one riparian’s use of the water renders it unfit for use by another,
the former is liable to the latter.150
B. Beyond Regulation: Other Innovative Proposals to Leverage the
Semicommons
If one accepts the conclusions in this article that, first, Wisconsin waters
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145. Smith, supra note 143, at 450 (“The Nature of Water Law”); id. at 466 (“Water law tends
to be viewed as either private property on the one hand or as a pure tort-like commons or a regulatory
regime on the other.”). The reference to “water law” seems an oversimplification given that Smith
refers here to private water rights rather than pollution control or other water quality concerns also
germane to “water law.”
146. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994)
(finding that reduction of the volume of a water body could destroy its quality and even constitute
“water pollution” under the Clean Water Act). Id.
147. Anne W. Squier, Water Quality Under Western Water Law, 21 ENVTL. L. 1081, 1083
(1991); see also Reed Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems Under Clean
Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 204 (2005) (“water quantity can significantly affect
water quality”); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Can the Clean Water Act Succeed as an Ecosystem
Protection Law?, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 46, 62 (2013) (water quality and water
quantity are “intimately and unavoidably linked”).
148. Smith, supra note 136, at 456.
149. Id. at 470 (citing “public trust uses”). In Wisconsin and many other states, the public trust
doctrine also protects uses tightly related to water quality, such as fishing, recreation, and scenic
beauty. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. DNR, 833 N.W.2d 800 ¶¶ 87–88 (Wis. 2013).
150. See, e.g., H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 100 S.W. 116, 117–18, 122 (Tenn. 1907)
(holding that “[a]ny use of . . . the water of a stream itself, which renders the water unwholesome,
offensive, or unfit for the purposes for which it is used, is unlawful.”).
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151. Accord ROBERT KERR ET AL., BEYOND REGULATION: EXPORTERS AND VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES, at ix (1998) (citing a “growing realization . . . that traditional regulatory
tools alone are not adequate”).
152. But see David A. Strifling, The Microbead-Free Waters Act of 2015: Model for Future
Environmental Legislation, or Black Swan?, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 151, 159–61 (2015)
(suggesting strategies for advocates of future environmental legislation).
153. Hocking v. Dodgeville, 768 N.W.2d 552 ¶¶ 14, 18 (describing “reasonable use” doctrine).
154. Accord Laura A. Cisneros, Environmental Resistance: Defying Capitalism’s Structure of
False Rebellion, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 7 (2015) (arguing that “environmental protection
and capitalism are inherently oppositional” and generate “antipathies so fundamental that they make
current environmental protection laws inadequate”).
155. Kerr, supra note 151, at xi.
156. See Suzy Friedman, Beyond Regulation: Making the Business Case For Sustainable
Farming (Jan. 7, 2015), http://blogs.edf.org/growingreturns/2015/01/07/beyond-regulation-makingthe-business-case-for-sustainable-farming/ [https://perma.cc/LRZ9-V7GB].
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face a variety of serious threats; that, second, existing laws and regulations are
not sufficient to control these threats;151 and that, third, the theory of the
semicommons implies both public and private rights and responsibilities with
respect to water quality, then the question becomes: What is to be done? New
or strengthened environmental regulations seem improbable in the current
political climate.152
One potential path for Wisconsin, in the face of retreating federal and
state involvement, is a greater role for local or private efforts to improve water
quality. Indeed, private water users should feel a moral obligation to maintain
or even improve water quality in light of their rights to use water under
Wisconsin’s system of “reasonable use.”153
Increased private engagement in water quality efforts face substantial
hurdles. At a minimum, private entities must be convinced of the “business
case” to become involved. This first assumes that historical antipathy of private
firms and individuals toward environmental protection154 can be overcome.
This issue is complex. Theoretically, several considerations might convince
private firms and individuals to embrace voluntary participation in
environmental protection. Properly designed and executed voluntary initiatives
can “cut costs, increase market share and create new market opportunities.”155
For example, in the context of sustainable agriculture leading to improved water
quality, the benefits could include improved profitability due to efficient
fertilizer management; increased confidence in grower decision-making as a
result of advanced data collection and management efforts; marketing
advantages given the sustainability demands increasingly imposed by retailers
upon suppliers; and even improved reputation among supply chain partners and
with consumers.156 Some optimistic estimates suggest that industry actually
prefers to self-adopt voluntary environmental conservation initiatives to
forestall environmental problems that would trigger the onset of mandatory
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regulations.157
However, other recent studies have shown that the voluntary adoption rate
of nutrient reduction technologies to improve water quality is relatively low,
even when substantial incentives are provided to do so.158 Sampled farmers
had an unrealistically high perception of existing water quality and,
unsurprisingly, strongly opposed penalties for noncompliance with
environmental regulations.159
Safeguards would be necessary to mitigate the risk of private involvement
with public trust resources. For example, strong objections have been raised to
direct ownership of public water utilities by for-profit entities.160
Environmental groups often strongly oppose even voluntary initiatives for
environmental protection, preferring the security of mandatory regulations and
enforcement efforts.161 Depending on the structure, public-private partnerships
are hailed in some quarters162 and disparaged in others.163 In any such
arrangement, the level of built-in safeguards to protect public safety is highly
variable from state to state.164
Assuming those hurdles are cleared, innovative public-private partnership
efforts to control nonpoint source pollution could shape up in the following
ways.
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157. Id.
158.
Florence G. Gachango et al., Adoption of Voluntary Water-Pollution Reduction
Technologies and Water Quality Perception Among Danish Farmers, 158 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 235,
235 (2015).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Food & Water Watch, Water Privatization: Facts and Figures (Aug. 31, 2015),
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/water-privatization-facts-and-figures
[https://perma.cc/BT7Y-4CTR] (“privatizing local water and sewer systems usually does farm more
harm than good for our communities”).
161. James Q. Lynch, Water Quality Advocates Say Voluntary Actions Not Working, THE
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2016 2:01 PM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/business/agriculture/wa
ter-quality-advocates-say-voluntary-actions-not-working-20161117 [https://perma.cc/2XKA-CTP7]
(environmental advocates call for “farmland regulation” instead of voluntary pollutant reduction
strategies); see also Kerr, supra note 151, at xi.
162. Michael Della Rocca, The Rising Advantage of Public-Private Partnerships, MCKINSEY
& CO. (July 2017) https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/ourinsights/the-rising-advantage-of-public-private-partnerships [https://perma.cc/W4CF-CTLH].
163. See, e.g., Food and Water Watch, supra note 136; David Hall, Why Public-Private
Partnerships Don’t Work, PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (Feb. 2015)
http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/rapport_eng_56pages_a4_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE8QF622].
164. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States:
Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 W M .& MARY ENVTL. L. POL’Y REV.
785, 792–93 (2009).
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1. “Sponge Cities”
In an era of decreasing federal and state involvement,165 local
environmental conservation efforts take on increased importance. In the
context of nonpoint source pollution, this can take the form of “green
infrastructure”166 and other devices to improve water quality.
This movement can take new inspiration from a (perhaps) unlikely source:
China.167 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a plan to transform
Chinese cities into “sponges.”168 These “sponge cities” are designed to retain
stormwater in a variety of ways, purifying it as it moves through “green
infrastructure” and soil, and ultimately storing it as groundwater for re-use.169
This process allows the city to regenerate and expand its own water supply
while simultaneously reducing the burden on traditional infrastructure, such as
wastewater treatment facilities. In 2015, the Chinese government released
detailed guidance “on [a]dvancing the [c]onstruction of [s]ponge [c]ities”
directing that 70% of urban rainfall will be captured and re-used.170 China now
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165. See, e.g., Evan Lehmann & Emily Holden, Trump Budget Cuts Funds for EPA by 31
Percent, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Mar. 16, 2017) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumpbudget-cuts-funds-for-epa-by-31-percent/ [https://perma.cc/56VW-J4RQ]; Associated Press,
Wisconsin DNR Sees Job Cuts, Slashed Budget (Jan. 15, 2017 11:53 AM)
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2017/01/15/wisconsin-dnr-job-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/3XSH-CK3F];
Siri Carpenter, How Scott Walker Dismantled Wisconsin’s Environmental Legacy, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (June 17, 2015) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-scott-walkerdismantled-wisconsin-s-environmental-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/VM5L-KAF5].
166. Green Infrastructure refers to a variety of “mechanisms that mimic, maintain, or restore
natural hydrological features in the urban landscape.” Caswell F. Holloway et al., Solving the CSO
Conundrum: Green Infrastructure and the Unfulfilled Promise of Federal-Municipal Cooperation, 38
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335, 335 (2014). See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green
Infrastructure, EPA.GOV (Oct. 20, 2017) https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/
N4C9-WVQK].
167. See Robert V. Percival, China’s “Green Leap Forward” Toward Global Environmental
Leadership, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 633, 633–34 (2011) (noting that China’s historical policies have been
described as a “War Against Nature” but that “there are signs of a dramatic improvement in
environmental consciousness in China in recent years”).
168. James Workman, Sponge Cities: Can China’s Model Go Global?, THE SOURCE (July 13,
2017), https://www.thesourcemagazine.org/sponge-cities-can-chinas-model-go-global/ [https://perma
.cc/6NNQ-KB2S].
169. Tools for “sponge cities” include bioswales, green roofs, retention ponds, and porous
pavements, among other things. Working together, these measures, when combined with others, can
reduce runoff from sponge cities by eighty-five percent. Id.
170. General Office of the State Council, Guiding Opinions of the General Office of the State
Council on Advancing the Construction of Sponge Cities, effective November 10, 2015. Translated
versions of the guidance are not freely available, but rough Internet translations show a well-formed
policy that both defines sponge city management, establishes the 70% requirement, and sets out basic
scientific
principles
to
guide
sponge
city
development.
See
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=zhTW&u=http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx%3Fcgid%3D258397%26lib%3Dlaw%26EncodingName%
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boasts more than thirty such “sponge cities.”171
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3Dbig5&prev=search [https://perma.cc/3D77-2MNA].
171. Workman, supra note 168.
172. Jeff Savage & Marc Ribaudo, Improving the Efficiency of Voluntary Water Quality
Conservation Programs, 92 LAND ECON. 148, 148 (2016). This is in stark contrast to externalities
derived from industrial “end-of-pipe” sources, dealt with by regulations issued under the authority of
the Clean Water Act. Id.
173. Id.
174. See generally id.
175. Id. at 155.
176. Id.
177. Minn. Stat. § 17.9891–17.9993 (2017).
178. MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM 6 (Jan. 30, 2015).
179. Id. at 7.
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2. Voluntary Programs and Initiatives
Voluntary programs to address environmental problems are nothing new.
In fact, “[e]nvironmental externalities emanating from agricultural production
have traditionally been dealt with in the United States through voluntary
approaches.”172 No doubt, however, there is room for improvement; as noted
above, these measures “have largely failed to improve water quality” in
impaired waters.173 Recent studies have shown that performance-based
approaches (measuring the ultimate performance of the measure) are more
efficient than approaches that specify adoption of a particular technology.174
However, performance-based policies “are difficult to implement for nonpoint
source pollution because pollutant discharge cannot easily be measured and
regulators lack the information necessary to set optimal performance goals.”175
Program leaders therefore often focus instead on inputs and management
practices, known as design-based approaches.176
Some Midwestern states already have voluntary programs for nonpoint
source control. Minnesota’s “Agricultural Water Quality Certification
Program” allows farmers to voluntarily implement certain conservation
practices in exchange for “regulatory certainty” for a period of ten years, along
with marketing status advantages and priority for technical and financial
assistance.177 Farmers who decide to take part in the program must verify
compliance with existing federal and state water quality laws and rules,
including the Clean Water Act.178 Field verification by program staff then
“establishes that the practices and commitments of certified producers are
accurate and that there are no additional resource concerns to be addressed.”179
In Iowa, the state’s “Nutrient Reduction Strategy” aims to reduce by 45%
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the load of phosphorus and nitrogen to the Gulf of Mexico.180 The Strategy
calls for “[a] concerted, cooperative and sustained effort by both point and
nonpoint sources” to meet this goal.181 Specifically, the Strategy involves
watershed prioritization and will employ a combination of on- and off-field
practices and pilot projects.182 As part of the strategy, Iowa launched the
Farmer Recognition Program to increase public recognition of participating
farmers, along with a statewide education and marketing campaign.183 The
Strategy is somewhat light on details of progress-measuring metrics, stating
only that Iowa will “develop new and expanded frameworks to track progress,
beyond the traditional ambient water quality monitoring networks.”184
Advocates describe these voluntary measures as flexible and effective,
especially as compared to the “blunt instrument[s]” embodied in mandatory
regulations that are “lock[ed] . . . in time” and “stifle . . . creativity.”185
Moreover, they can often be implemented quickly as compared to traditional
regulations, which often take years to draft and implement and are often bogged
down by lengthy legal challenges.
Other proposals for more indirect private involvement could include
increased support for grant programs or public educational campaigns.
CONCLUSION
As it moves forward in the twenty-first century, Wisconsin faces many
threats to a resource at the core of its identity—its abundant fresh water. One
thing is clear, traditional “command and control” regulatory approaches,
standing alone, are not likely to suffice. Instead, overcoming these challenges
will require innovative approaches that are just beginning to emerge.
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180. IOWA DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND LAND STEWARDSHIP ET AL., IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION
STRATEGY:A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-BASED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS AND REDUCE NUTRIENTS
TO IOWA WATERS AND THE GULF OF MEXICO 1 (Sept. 2016).
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id. at 21.
183. Id. at 22.
184. Id. at 24.
185. Dirck Steimel, Northey: Voluntary Water Quality Effort Far Superior to Regulation (Feb.
2, 2015) IOWA FARM BUREAU https://www.iowafarmbureau.com/Article/Northey-Voluntary-waterquality-effort-far-superior-to-regulation [https://perma.cc/BDW2-WZEH] (quoting Iowa Agriculture
Secretary Bill Northey).
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